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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided
1
Padilla v. Kentucky. This decision forever alters criminal defense
attorneys’ duty to advise their clients about the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea. The Court held that when
deportation consequences are “truly clear,” a criminal defense
2
lawyer’s duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

† Joanna Woolman is an adjunct professor at William Mitchell College of
Law. She is the director of the Reentry Clinic.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice
Alito wrote a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia wrote a
dissent, joined by Justice Thomas.
2. Id. at 1483.
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Never before has the Court held that there is a duty to advise
3
clients about a “collateral” consequence to a plea. The duty it
creates to provide accurate and client-centered representation
around the issue of deportation is a huge step forward because it
greatly expands the responsibilities of a criminal defense
attorney—it is now a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel not to advise about a collateral sanction.
The Padilla opinion is a wake-up call—that in order to provide
effective representation in this day and age, where the number of
collateral consequences is rapidly growing—it is not enough to
simply advise clients about the direct criminal sanctions of their
conviction in the context of deportation. The reason is because
other collateral consequences exist that are just as clear and just as
dire. This article argues that Padilla must be applied to these other
circumstances where statutory civil consequences that stem from a
4
criminal conviction are “truly clear,” meaning direct, and “most
5
difficult” to divorce from the conviction, meaning dire.
Collateral consequences are routinely discussed before a plea,
and many defense attorneys try to advise their clients about as many
of them as they can. Clients often have no idea what other issues
may await them after their conviction, so it is a defense attorney’s
6
job to tell them.
Ideally, criminal defense attorneys would inform their clients
about every collateral consequence that results from a plea.
However, that may be impossible given that in Minnesota alone,
7
more than two hundred collateral consequences exist. These
consequences range in type and severity, including restrictions on
3. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted) (defining “collateral” consequence as a
matter not within the sentencing authority of the state trial court).
4. Id. at 1483. The court noted that when a collateral “consequence is ‘truly
clear’ . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.
5. Id. at 1481. The court intimated that when the collateral consequence is
hard to divorce from the conviction, there is an even stronger need for counsel to
advise regarding the collateral consequence. Id.
6. The author has worked as a public defender in Minnesota for five years,
during which time she has advised hundreds of clients prior to a plea. She has
worked as a public defender in Isanti County, and most recently in Anoka County.
Both counties are in the Tenth Judicial District of Minnesota. The author, like
many attorneys, tries to advise her clients of as many collateral consequences as
she can.
7. Expunging Criminal Records, THE RIGHTS STUFF (Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Rts., St.
Paul, Minn.), April 2009, at 13, available at http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us
/education/articles/rs_pdf/rs09_sprin0g.pdf [hereinafter Expunging Criminal
Records].
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driving privileges, hunting rights, voting rights, and public
8
This article argues that there are three particular
housing.
collateral consequences in Minnesota that clearly fall under the
Padilla standard. For these particular sanctions, defense attorneys
must provide their clients clear and accurate information about
them prior to a plea.
In Section II, this article analyzes the Padilla case and argues
that it has created a two-prong test for determining when a
collateral consequence is direct and dire enough to require an
attorney to clearly advise a criminal defendant about it prior to
trial. In Section III, this article provides examples of the support
for a broader application of Padilla in the legal community. In
Section IV, this article argues that Padilla should control three
particular collateral consequences in Minnesota because they are
also direct and dire. These three sanctions include child custody,
disqualification for licensing by the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), and registration as a sex offender.
II.

PADILLA’S NEW “TRULY CLEAR” STANDARD

José Padilla, a native of Honduras and a Vietnam veteran, has
been a permanent resident of the United States for more than forty
9
After pleading guilty to the transportation of a large
years.
amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in Kentucky, he faced
10
deportation.
Padilla filed a claim for post-conviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla claimed his
attorney not only failed to advise of this consequence prior to his
entering a plea, but also told him that he “did not have to worry
about immigration status since he had been in the country so
11
long.” Padilla relied on his attorney’s incorrect advice when he
made the decision to enter a plea of guilty to drug charges that
12
The Court, in an
made his deportation virtually mandatory.
13
opinion written by Justice Stevens, found that when a criminal
defense attorney gives incorrect advice or omits advice to clients of
their “truly clear” potential for deportation upon a guilty plea, the
defense attorney is not providing adequate assistance of counsel
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id.
Id. at 1473.
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pursuant to the Sixth Amendment as laid out by the Court in
14
Strickland v. Washington. The Court found that the relevant terms
of the immigration statute were clear, and that the consequence
15
was sufficiently direct. Further, the Court agreed with Mr. Padilla
that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him
that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to
16
automatic deportation.”
The Court found that the civil consequence of being deported
is a “particularly severe ‘penalty,’ but it is not, in a strict sense, a
17
criminal sanction.” This civil consequence is “intimately related to
the criminal process,” and the penalty of deportation is “most
18
difficult” to divorce from the conviction. The Court found that in
many cases, preserving a client’s right to remain in the United
States may be “more important to the client than any potential jail
19
sentence.”
The Court declined to comment on whether that
distinction is appropriate in other circumstances because it focused
on deportation.
The Court rejected the trial court’s assertion that there is no
duty to advise about collateral matters—i.e., those matters not
20
within the sentencing authority of the state trial court. Arguably,
the Court left open whether this holding could be applied to other
indirect consequences of a plea when it stated that it has never
applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
define the scope of reasonable professional assistance required by
21
the Constitution under Strickland.
The Court cited to the
22
overwhelming support for its decision among the defense bar. It
pointed directly to the “weight of prevailing professional norms”
14. Id. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court defined a two-part test to
determine whether a defendant had a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).
To satisfy this two-part test, an attorney’s representation must fall below “an
objective standard of reasonableness” and there must be a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
be different. Id. at 688.
15. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (finding the penalty of deportation “nearly an
automatic result”).
16. Id. at 1478 (declining to rule on the second prong of Strickland and
remanding the analysis to the trial court for further review).
17. Id. at 1481.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1483.
20. Id. at 1481.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1482.
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that support the view that counsel must advise a client about the
23
risk of deportation. The Court pointed out that “authorities of
every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal
defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises,
and state and city bar publications—universally require defense
24
attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences . . . .”
The Court did not discuss whether prevailing professional norms
would support a wider application of this standard to other
collateral consequences that were as direct and dire.
The Padilla Court seems to have established a two-prong test to
find that deportation requires a duty for defense attorneys to advise
their clients. First, Padilla established that deportation is a “truly
clear” or nearly automatic consequence of certain criminal
25
convictions. Second, the Court defined a collateral consequence
as something that can be as punitive or dire as the conviction
26
itself. The Court found that the penalty of deportation is “most
27
difficult” to divorce from the conviction. Thus, the Court found
that deportation was direct and dire, and that these two factors
warranted an affirmative duty for criminal defense attorneys to
28
advise their clients about this specific collateral consequence.
III.

SOURCES WITHIN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY THAT SUPPORT
PADILLA’S HOLDING

An amicus brief was filed in this case, affirming that many
members of the legal community support a broader application of
29
Padilla.
This brief was signed by more than twenty criminal
30
defense organizations. This large and diverse group found that
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1483.
26. See id. at 1481–82.
27. Id. at 1481.
28. Id. at 1486–87.
29. See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567356 [hereinafter Padilla Amicus Brief].
30. See id. The signing organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
are as follows: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Legal
Aid & Defender Association, Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, Immigration Impact Unit of the Massachusetts
Committee for Public Counsel Services, New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association, New York State Defenders Association, Oregon Criminal Defense
Lawyers Association, Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Washington

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7

2011]

A CASE FOR A BROADER APPLICATION

845

the criminal defense function includes advising the client of every
31
important consequence of a plea. They concluded “A defense attorney
who negotiates a plea resulting in the defendant’s effective exile,
without so much as investigating that possibility or asking whether
it matters to the defendant, has not fulfilled that attorney’s duty to
32
the bar, to the Constitution, or, most of all, to the client.” They
found that the fundamental client-centered approach at the heart
of a defense counsel’s role demands that the attorney conduct a
thorough “exploration with the client of all important
consequences of a client’s decision to plead, regardless of whether
33
those consequences are labeled ‘direct’ or ‘collateral.’”
The Padilla amicus brief did not suggest that this duty is not
without logistical concerns. They addressed specifically whether
34
this duty would create an undue burden on defense counsel. The
amici curiae ultimately concluded it would not, and that “these
35
obligations are not only appropriate, but essential.” They relied
on the overwhelming amount of information available to defense
attorneys regarding deportation, including hundreds of training
sessions, free websites containing specific information about
deportation, and many national publications devoted to the issue
36
of deportation as a result of a conviction. Accurate and easily
accessible information about the consequences of immigration is
easy to find and learn about for any attorney in criminal practice
37
and is free of charge in many cases.

Defender Association, Legal Aid Society of the City of New York, Neighborhood
Defender Service of Harlem, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Florence
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, Immigrant Defense Project, Immigrant
Legal Resource Center, and National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers
Guild. See id.
31. Padilla Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *2.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *14.
34. Id. at *22. The Padilla court also noted that attorneys in all practice areas
must advise clients about consequences outside of their area of expertise, and that
the requirement to do so in Padilla is not too big a burden on attorneys. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1492–93 (2010).
35. Padilla Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *16.
36. Id. at *28.
37. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (providing
online resources and direct counseling to attorneys on the phone); IMMIGRATION
DEFENSE PROJECT, http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org (last visited Oct. 26,
2010) (providing a hotline for attorneys advertised on the webpage).
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Beyond these many resources relating to the specific issue of
deportation as a civil sanction, there has also been a national
movement focused on educating the bench and bar about
collateral consequences.
In 2009, The Uniform Collateral
Consequences of a Conviction Act (UCCCA) was established by the
38
Uniform Law Commission, a national law reform group.
The
Uniform Law Commission was concerned about the increase and
severity of collateral consequences, due in large part to the
39
overwhelming increase in convictions in the United States.
The UCCCA was created to help attorneys and judges in
different jurisdictions to impose some discipline on the process by
40
which collateral consequences are enacted and enforced. A broad
goal of the UCCCA is to help defense attorneys include
consideration of collateral consequences prior to a plea by
compiling and publishing them in an organized way—state by
41
state. This register of consequences, once completed, can be an
asset to attorneys who can look to one resource for a
comprehensive list of collateral sanctions. The UCCCA also
contains provisions mandating that defendants be told at an early
point in their case that certain collateral consequences may attach
42
to their conviction.
This reform act illustrates a national
consensus that collateral consequences must be addressed by
attorneys and the courts.

38. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2009), available at http://www
.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2009_final.htm [hereinafter UCCCA].
39. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2008 Draft), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2008_amdraft.htm.
This
Act was amended in the summer of 2010, and the amendments can be found on
the same site.
40. See UCCCA, supra note 38; see also A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE … UNIFORM
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, http://www.nccusl.com/Update
/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccca.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2010)
[hereinafter FACTS ABOUT THE UCCCA].
41. See UCCCA, supra note 38; see also FACTS ABOUT THE UCCCA, supra note
40.
42. UCCCA, supra note 38, at § 5.
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APPLYING THE PADILLA STANDARD MORE BROADLY IN
MINNESOTA

The climate of practicing criminal defense is changing because
increasingly more collateral consequences are triggered when a
person pleads guilty. Nationally, estimates state that in some states
more than seven hundred collateral sanctions are imposed, with
nearly eighty percent of them affecting employment, nearly all of
43
which last for life.
More people are affected by collateral
consequences than ever before because more people than ever
have been convicted of a crime—perhaps as many as one hundred
44
million people.
In Minnesota, as is true nationally, the number and severity of
collateral consequences is growing. Although data about the exact
number of collateral consequences in Minnesota is hard to
pinpoint, some estimates state that more than two hundred may be
45
imposed by statutes and regulations in Minnesota. The number
of collateral sanctions has grown in the last decade, particularly in
the area of sex offender registration. This trend may be due to
46
several serious and well-publicized violent sex crimes. Beyond the
number of consequences, the number of individuals affected has
grown in recent years, as Minnesota convicts and incarcerates more
and more people. In Minnesota, in 1982, less than one percent of
47
the population was under correctional supervision. Twenty-five
48
years later, this number has increased by 284%.
Collateral consequences for a conviction in Minnesota include
many restrictions, such as revocation of driving privileges,
suspension of a hunting license or right to possess a gun,
49
ineligibility to vote, and disqualification from public benefits.
43. Richard T. Cassidy, The Time to Reform our Law of Collateral Consequences has
Arrived, ON LAWYERING: NEWS AND COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
LAWYERS, June 10, 2010, http://onlawyering.com/2010/06/the-time-to-reform-our
-law-of-collateral-consequences-has -arrived/.
44. Id.
45. Expunging Criminal Records, supra note 7, at 13.
46. See, e.g., Bob Reha, Rodriguez guilty in Sjodin case, Minn. Pub. Radio, Aug.
30, 2006, available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/08/30
/rodriguezverdict/. The rape and murder of Drew Sjodin led to several
significant changes in Minnesota law relating to sex offenders in 2003 and 2004
after the conviction of her killer. Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.nsopw.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
47. Expunging Criminal Records, supra note 7, at 12.
48. Id.
49. MINN. STAT. § 609B.340–345 (2008) (providing for collateral sanctions
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These are just a few examples of many. While all collateral
consequences negatively affect clients, three clear examples in
Minnesota exist where the Padilla standard must be applied
because the consequences are so direct and dire. In these
situations, not advising clients prior to a plea constitutes a violation
50
of the new Padilla test. Such situations include: restrictions on
custody, disqualification from licensing by the Minnesota
Department of Health and Human Services, and all of the
51
restrictions that accompany sex offender registration.
In Minnesota, these three civil consequences are found in
three particular state statutes and are accessible to all criminal
defense attorneys who possess a general criminal handbook for the
52
state. In addition, many helpful and free websites are available to
53
provide information about collateral sanctions in Minnesota, and
regular CLE presentations and bar publications are available to
help educate defense attorneys about the most serious
54
consequences. Because the issue of collateral sanctions has been
increasing on the state and national radar as more individuals are
affected by them in their post-conviction lives, more resources have
become available to help clients and attorneys make informed
decisions.
Below, this article discusses the stories of three people who
were not adequately advised of collateral consequences that meet
55
the Padilla test and how their lives have been altered by these
collateral consequences. All of these people now say their decision
related to possession of firearms, explosives, and similar devices); MINN. STAT. §
609B.600, 609B.610–615 (2008) (providing for collateral sanctions related to civil
rights and remedies); MINN. STAT. § 609B.400, 609B.405–465 (2008) (providing for
collateral sanctions related to services and public benefits).
50. See supra Section II.
51. MINN. STAT. §§ 518.179, 245C.15, 243.166 (2008).
52. WEST’S MINNESOTA CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, (West’s Publishing ed., 2010
ed. 2009). This handbook is given to every public defender annually.
53. A cursory Google search yielded hundreds of websites dedicated to
providing specific information about collateral sanctions in Minnesota. Many of
these sites are sponsored by private attorneys and some are sponsored by local
nonprofits. The entire list of collateral sanctions under Section 609B of the
Minnesota code can be found on the Revisor of Statutes webpage. See 2010
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609B Collateral Sanctions, MINN. OFFICE OF THE
REVISOR OF STATUTES, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609B&view=
chapter (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
54. See Thomas C. Plunkett, Collateral Consequences and Expungement Update,
ELIMINATION OF BIAS CLE (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www.clarionlegal.com
/index.cfm?page=Replay%20List#collateralconsequences.
55. See supra Section II.
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to plead would certainly have been different if they had been
advised of these consequences by their attorney. These stories, like
many others, illustrate how important it is that defense attorneys in
Minnesota begin advising their clients about these consequences
immediately; the stakes are simply too high for clients to plead
without this knowledge.
A. Child Custody
The first person is Tina, a woman who sought to regain
custody of her children after being convicted of first-degree sexual
56
conduct. Tina was a mother of three children and resided with
her family in a small community in central Minnesota. In 2006,
Tina had a brief sexual relationship with her fifteen-year-old
stepson who had recently moved into the family’s home and was a
mentally unstable, violent teenager. Shortly after this encounter,
Tina became pregnant and had a daughter. After her daughter was
born, someone tipped off the authorities that the child did not
belong to Tina’s husband, so Tina was arrested and charged with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Tina was represented by a
public defender and, in her words, was strongly urged to take a
plea bargain in this case to ensure she would spend less time in
57
prison than the maximum prison sentence for this crime.
Section 518.179 of the Minnesota Code prevents people
58
charged with certain crimes from having custody of their children.
This statute changes the standard and shifts the burden for custody
and parenting time for individuals convicted of approximately
59
twenty different crimes.
Specifically, a person seeking child
custody or parenting time, who has been convicted of one of these
56. The author met Tina two years ago in Minnesota through her work in the
Reentry Clinic at William Mitchell College of Law. Tina requested assistance from
the clinic to help her regain custody of her children after being released from
prison. After two full years, and much litigation, the author is still working toward
this goal for Tina. Tina has agreed to let the author use her story in this paper,
although the author has changed her name.
57. The mandatory sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct in
Minnesota is 144 months in prison. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N,
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 59 (2010).
58. MINN. STAT. § 518.179, subdiv. 2 (2008).
59. Id. The crimes for which child custody may be affected include murder,
manslaughter, assault (first- through third-degrees), kidnapping, depriving
another of parenting rights, criminal sexual conduct (first- through thirddegrees), solicitation of a child, incest, malicious punishment of a child, neglect of
a child, terroristic threats, felony harassment, or stalking. Id.
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offenses, has the burden to prove that custody or parenting time is
60
in the best interests of the child. This means a court must go
above and beyond simply finding that a person has a right to be a
parent. The court must determine that an individual is fit to see
61
his or her children based on certain factors. A guardian ad litem
must be appointed by the court in each case where the court finds
it is not in the best interests of the child to be returned to the
62
parent.
This statutory consequence is direct and dire for many people
63
in Minnesota, and it clearly meets the Padilla test.
The
64
consequence is “truly clear,” meaning that it follows directly from
one of twenty or so convictions. It is also dire because it is a penalty
65
“most difficult” to divorce from the conviction. As a practical
matter, most people convicted of these offenses will not be able to
regain custody of their children, or even secure regular visitation
without the help of a lawyer. A lawyer is something that many of
them cannot afford. The result is the loss of their family; for many
women in particular, being a mother is the most important role of
their lives.
At no time during meetings with her attorney, or when she
entered a plea in front of a judge, did her attorney or the judge
advise Tina that entering a plea of guilty to this offense would make
her ability to have custody of her children virtually impossible after
she was released from prison. She did not receive this information
despite the fact that this consequence, stated in section 518.179 of
66
the Minnesota Code, was truly clear.

60. Id. at subdiv. 1.
61. Id. The best interest factors are listed in section 518.17 of the Minnesota
Code. These factors include: the wishes of the child’s parent or parents; the
reasonable preference of child (if child is of sufficient age); the child’s primary
caretaker; the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and child; the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents, and siblings
or others; the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; the length of
time the child has lived in a stable environment and the desire to maintain this
stability; the permanence as a family unit; and the mental and physical health of
all individuals involved. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subdiv. 1 (2008).
62. § 518.179, subdiv. 1.
63. See supra Section II.
64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
65. Id. at 1481.
66. MINN. STAT. § 518.179, subdiv. 2 (2008).
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For people like Tina, the penalty of losing custody of their
children is nearly as impossible to “divorce” from the conviction as
Padilla states about the penalty of deportation. Like deportation,
the loss of child custody is a serious civil consequence. The
conviction may prevent Tina from ever having custody of her
children again. Like the federal deportation statutes in Padilla, this
statute in Minnesota has been amended to include more crimes
67
over time, thereby affecting a greater number of people.
Tina’s children are the most important part of her life. If Tina
had known that this plea would affect her ability to be a mother
when she was released from prison, specifically because of a statute
in Minnesota that made this consequence clear, she would not have
pleaded guilty. After three years, Tina only has limited and
supervised visitation with her children and likely will never regain
full custody of them.
B.

Background Checks for Employment Requiring a DHHS License

The next person is Beth, a woman who had worked for more
than fifteen years in a nursing home requiring a Minnesota
68
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) license. This
woman was charged with domestic assault for hitting her boyfriend
after he had shoved her into a wall during a fight. As a result of
pleading guilty to fifth-degree domestic assault, for which she
69
received the criminal sanction of a fifty dollar fine, Beth has been
prevented from making a living in the field in which she was
trained because the DHHS revoked her license for seven years after
70
the DHHS learned of her conviction.
Beth is a single mother with two children under the age of five.
Although she received food support and state medical benefits, she
did not receive any cash assistance from the state. Instead, she
worked long hours to support her two children. At the time Beth’s
67. Section 518.179 of the Minnesota Code was created in 1997. MINN. STAT.
§ 518.179 (1997). The section has been amended three times since then. Prior to
1997, there were no defined convictions that affected custody. See id. § 518.179,
subdiv. 2 (1998).
68. Beth is not the real name of the individual described above. The author
has asked this woman’s permission to use her story in this article. The author,
Joanna Woolman, was the attorney who represented Beth two years ago in the
story described above.
69. A misdemeanor in Minnesota is punishable by up to ninety days in jail
and a $1000 fine. MINN. STAT. § 609.03 (2008).
70. See MINN. STAT. § 245C.15, subdiv. 4(b) (2008).
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attorney represented her, the attorney was familiar with section
245C.15 of the Minnesota Code, and told Beth that this conviction
may affect her ability to work in a nursing home. The attorney
encouraged Beth to look into this issue, and left it at that.
However, had the attorney taken a more careful look at section
245C.15 and the specific crimes and disqualification periods, the
attorney would have realized that Beth’s conviction would result in
an automatic seven-year disqualification and virtually guarantee
71
that she would lose her job. This penalty is exponentially more
serious than the conviction and fifty dollar fine she received in the
criminal case.
A person with a job or looking for a job that requires a DHHS
license can have their career come to an abrupt end if they are
convicted of certain crimes. Section 245C.15 of the Minnesota
Code contains the list of disqualifying crimes or conduct for
individuals who either have or need to seek a license from the
72
DHHS for many types of employment.
Individuals can be disqualified from receiving a license for life,
73
for fifteen years, for ten years, and for seven years.
For each
74
period of disqualification, the statute lists the qualifying crimes.
75
Disqualification can occur based merely on an arrest.
Disqualification is a civil penalty, although directly related to a
criminal conviction.
To challenge disqualification, most
individuals will need legal counsel to navigate the administrative
process.
License disqualification under section 254C.15 of the
76
Minnesota Code meets the Padilla standard because the
consequences of a conviction upon a DHHS license are “truly
77
clear.” The statute states that the commissioner of the DHHS
shall conduct a background check for each individual applying for
78
a position listed in the first subdivision in the statute. Therefore,
71. See id. at subdiv. 4(a)(2).
72. Id. Section 245C.04 of the Minnesota Code includes a list of each type of
job for which a background check and license is required by the DHHS. MINN.
STAT. § 245C.04 (2008). These jobs include: all licensing programs, state agencies,
personal care providers, supplemental nursing agencies, personnel agencies, and
educational agencies. Id.
73. See § 245C.15, subdiv. 1–4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
78. § 254C.15, subdivs. 1–4.
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if a person is employed in a job requiring a license, or plans to
pursue a job requiring a license, a conviction listed in the statute
will prevent that person from being considered because he or she
cannot pass the regular background check.
When people lose their ability to work in the field in which
they were trained, that is a dire consequence. If a person cannot
earn a living, then that person is more likely to lose the stability in
life that protects his or her family and wellbeing. In particular, if a
disqualification of a license is for life, then this penalty certainly is
as serious, often more serious, than the criminal sanction. Finally,
while there are ways people may challenge this disqualification,
realistically, not many people will be able to successfully challenge
it without the assistance of an attorney—another reason this
consequence is dire.
There may have been nothing that could have been done to
prevent this disqualification because even arrest records can be
79
used in some cases to disqualify.
But nevertheless, this client
80
deserved to know the nearly automatic and “truly clear”
consequence of her plea. With a closer read of this statute, Beth’s
attorney could have helped her understand the specific and serious
consequences to her plea and the effect they would have on her
ability to earn a living. For people like Beth, her defense attorney
was realistically the only person who may have provided accurate
and clear advice about the effects of her conviction upon her
career.
C.

Sex Offender Registration

The last person is John, a young man who as a thirteen-year81
old boy, pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
This charge had been amended down from first-degree criminal
sexual conduct for inappropriately touching his two-year-old foster
sister. John was himself molested as a child and, at the age of
eleven, was removed from his home and placed into foster care.
John pleaded guilty and was ordered to complete sex offender
treatment, which he did at age thirteen. The results from a
behavioral psychologist found that this boy was not a predatory
79. See id. (noting that each subdivision includes disqualification based on
preponderance of the evidence).
80. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
81. The author met this remarkable young man at a conference when he was
twenty-one years old.
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offender and was at a very low risk to reoffend.
Because John was charged originally with the offense of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, he must register as a sex offender
in Minnesota, even though his offense was committed when he was
thirteen. At no time did his public defender tell him about this
registration requirement. When he entered his plea, he vaguely
remembers the judge advising him about this requirement.
However, at age thirteen, John did not understand what it really
82
meant.
John succeeded in graduating from high school with honors.
He was accepted to college at a state university and when he filled
out his housing application for dorm placement he was denied
access to any dorm on campus. The denial was not because of his
criminal conviction, which is sealed because he was a minor, but
because he has to register as a sex offender, even as an adult. After
finding alternative housing at a huge financial cost, John graduated
from college. John learned as he was searching for majors that
almost any professional career, including the one he wanted in law
enforcement, would not be an option because he had to register as
a sex offender.
Section 243.166 of the Minnesota Code is something that every
83
defense attorney should read and understand; when an individual
has to register as a sex offender as a result of a criminal conviction,
that registration limits the individual’s ability to succeed in almost
every aspect of his or her life. Because of the registration, many
basic necessities such as housing and employment are nearly
84
impossible for clients to achieve.
Because the requirement to
register and the severe consequences that flow as a direct result
85
from a conviction are “truly clear,” and because they have the
82. The fact that John did not understand what the judge told him highlights
why defense attorneys are in the best position to discuss collateral sanctions with
their clients. Attorneys are able to discuss the likely collateral consequences that
stem from a plea at a time in the process when clients can take in this information
and make an informed choice, rather than when they are standing before a court
and already entering their plea.
83. MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2008) (explaining the process of registration of
predatory offenders).
84. See id. at subdiv. 1b. This section does not contain any particular
restrictions to housing or employment, but it does establish the crimes for which a
person has to register. Id. This requirement to register triggers a myriad of
collateral sanctions, many of which are often unknown. Federal housing law
prevents sex offenders from federal housing. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13663(a) (2006).
85. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
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potential to permanently derail the future of an individual, they,
86
more than any other consequence, meet the Padilla standard.
The specific registration requirements, including the
convictions requiring registration and registration procedure, are
87
clearly laid out in section 243.166 of the Minnesota Code. For
example, the crime of criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree,
which is contained in the list of offenses requiring registration,
requires individuals to register if they are merely charged with a firstdegree offense, even if they plead to a much lesser charge, and
even if they are a teenager and their conviction would not follow
88
them into adulthood. If a person fails to register as provided by
this statute, then he or she has committed a new felony which
89
could result in prison time. If a person who is required to register
is charged with a new crime and spends time in jail, then the
90
registration period is automatically extended for ten years.
These consequences can be particularly harsh for juveniles
who are convicted of sexual offenses, and who might be too young
to understand the serious ramifications of registration after
entering a plea as a teenager.
In this case, John’s criminal conviction did not follow him into
adulthood, but the collateral consequence of registration did. The
collateral penalty was worse than the criminal sanction. John said
that if he had been aware of the requirement to register for life as a
direct result of his plea, then he would not have pleaded guilty.
91
The Padilla Court’s two-part test clearly applies to advising clients
about registration, a penalty as direct and severe as deportation.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Padilla, the Court found that there are serious civil
consequences that are directly connected to a criminal conviction
and that defendants should be told about these things at a point in
the process when they are able to make informed decisions about
92
their future with the most accurate information possible. Padilla

86. See supra Section II.
87. MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b (listing offenses where registration is
required).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at subdiv. 5 (explaining the criminal penalty for not registering).
90. Id. at subdiv. 4(d).
91. See supra Section II.
92. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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goes on to provide a test to determine when a collateral
consequence is direct and dire enough to require attorneys to
93
advise clients about it prior to a plea.
In Minnesota, hundreds of consequences to convictions exist.
However, three stand out as ones that should meet the Padilla test.
Defense attorneys must perform their duty by advising each client
they represent about these collateral sanctions prior to their plea.

93.

See supra Section II.
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